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ABSTRACT
We study the effects of minimum wages and the EITC in the post-welfare reform era.  For the minimum
wage, the evidence points to disemployment effects that are concentrated among young minority men.
 For young women, there is little evidence that minimum wages reduce employment, with the exception
of high school dropouts.  In contrast, evidence strongly suggests that the EITC boosts employment
of young women (although not teenagers). We also explore how minimum wages and the EITC interact,
and the evidence reveals policy effects that vary substantially across different groups.  For example,
higher minimum wages appear to reduce earnings of minority men, and more so when the EITC is
high.  In contrast, our results indicate that the EITC boosts employment and earnings for minority
women, and coupling the EITC with a higher minimum wage appears to enhance this positive effect.
 Thus, whether or not the policy combination of a high EITC and a high minimum wage is viewed
as favorable or unfavorable depends in part on whose incomes policymakers are trying to increase.
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The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was enacted in 1975 and has, over time, become a staple 
of U.S. antipoverty policy.  At the federal level, significant expansions in the generosity of the credit took 
place in the 1980s and 1990s, boosting the credit rate from 10% in 1984 to 40% (with two children) in 
1996, where it has remained since.  In addition, some states have introduced their own EITC programs, 
which typically provide families in the state with a percentage supplement to the federal EITC.  The 
number of states with such an EITC increased from seven states in 1996 to 19 states and the District of 
Columbia in 2007, raising the percentage of the 16-64 year-old population residing in states 
supplementing the federal EITC from 14% to nearly 40%.
1 
Previous studies of the EITC typically find that this program is effective at increasing the labor 
force attachment and earnings of low-income women and families with children.  For example, Eissa and 
Liebman (1996) show that the federal EITC increases employment of young, unskilled women with 
children, Meyer (2002) concludes that a higher federal or state credit boosts employment of single 
mothers, and Liebman (1998) and Scholz (1994) find that a large proportion of EITC payments go to poor 
families.
2  Similarly, our own previous research indicates that the EITC outperforms the minimum wage 
in terms of its beneficial effects on the distribution of family earnings.
3   
However, some researchers point out that the labor supply response associated with the EITC 
may cause the market wage to fall.
4  If so, some of the gains from the EITC that are intended for eligible 
                                                 
1 This calculation is based on the CPS data described below.  The 19 states with EITC supplements in 2007 were 
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin, and the 
supplemental EITC in those states ranges from 4 to 43% of the federal credit.  In addition, EITC supplements 
became effective in 2008 in Louisiana, Michigan, and North Carolina.  
2 Extensive surveys of previous research on the EITC can be found in Hoffman and Seidman (2003) and Hotz and 
Scholz (2003).  Leigh (2005) also finds evidence of a positive supply response on the intensive margin (hours).  
The only study we know of that fails to find positive labor supply effects on those likely to be eligible for the 
EITC is Cancian and Levinson (2005), which examines the effects of Wisconsin’s higher EITC supplement for 
families with three children. 
3 Indeed, the minimum wage appears to have no beneficial effects on low-income families and may even adversely 
affect them.  See Neumark and Wascher (2001), as well as Burkhauser et al. (1996) and Neumark and Wascher 
(forthcoming). 
4 See, for example, Leigh (2007) and Rothstein (2008), who find that an increase in the generosity of the EITC puts 
downward pressure on the wages of low-skilled workers already in the labor market.  One might expect 
employers of low-wage workers to favor the EITC (over, for example, the minimum wage) if the incidence of the 2 
workers will instead be reaped by employers, and there may be negative spillovers on the wages and 
incomes of low-skilled workers not eligible for the EITC.
5  In light of these potential general equilibrium 
effects, some economists and policymakers have recently pointed to the minimum wage as a way to 
mitigate any fall in wages.  In particular, these advocates claim that the EITC and the minimum wage may 
be mutually reinforcing (i.e., complementary), with a higher minimum wage enhancing the effectiveness 
of the EITC in helping poor and low-income families.
6        
In this paper, we examine potential interactions between the EITC and the minimum wage.  We 
begin in the next section of the paper with a theoretical discussion of how these two policies might 
interact, noting that some models suggest that the two policies are reinforcing, while others suggest that 
they are offsetting, at least for some subgroups of the population.  To preview that discussion, the 
explanation we regard as most compelling begins by allowing for heterogeneity of individuals who would 
earn wages near the minimum if they worked.  In that case, either a minimum wage or an EITC can 
induce some individuals to enter the labor market, perhaps (especially in the case of the minimum wage) 
displacing others of lower productivity.
7  However, there may be other individuals with higher reservation 
wages who enter the labor market only when there is both a high minimum wage and a more generous 
EITC.  If these individuals are the ones to whom we would like to try to redistribute income (e.g., if 
single mothers with children have particularly high reservation wages among roughly comparably-skilled 
workers), then combining the EITC with a higher minimum wage may enhance the beneficial 
distributional effects of the EITC.   
                                                                                                                                                             
EITC is on workers.  Although it is difficult to establish explicitly whether businesses support particular policies,  
once piece of evidence in this regard is that the Employment Policies Institute, which reportedly receives funding 
from the restaurant industry (Greenhouse, 2006; Kilborn, 1997), strongly favors the EITC over the minimum 
wage (Garthwaite, 2004). 
5 As explained below, a very small EITC payment is available to families without children.  As a result, many low-
skilled workers (unless they are under age 25 or over age 64) are not strictly “ineligible” for the EITC but rather 
are simply unlikely to gain much from it.  We use “ineligible” as a short-hand for those who are not eligible for 
the much more generous EITC available to families with children.     
6 See, e.g., Bernstein (2004), Fiscal Policy Institute (2004), and Levitis and Johnson (2006). 
7 The conventional theory does not imply that employment of any particular subgroup will decrease in response to a 
higher minimum wage; it only predicts that overall labor demand for less-skilled workers will fall.  In particular, 
individuals for whom the market wage was previously below the reservation wage could, after a minimum wage 
increase, be drawn into the labor force.  For example, Neumark and Wascher (1996) find that an increase in the 
minimum wage induces some higher-skilled teenagers to leave school and enter the labor market. 3 
On the other hand, for groups less likely to be eligible for the EITC, such as teenagers and low-
skilled adult males, a high minimum wage coupled with an EITC could represent a “double hit,” with the 
minimum wage reducing their employment prospects via the higher wage floor imposed on employers, 
and the EITC reducing their employment prospects via the increased supply of women entering the labor 
market.  Thus, the effects of interactions between these policies, and how these interactive effects vary 
across different groups, are potentially quite complex.  Widespread interest in the effectiveness of these 
policies at the federal level, along with the increasing number of states implementing state EITCs as well 
as higher state minimum wages, makes it important to study how they interact.   
II. Minimum Wage-EITC Interactions 
  The limited research that compares the effects of minimum wages and the EITC has generally not 
considered the potential for interactions between the two policies.  However, the policies are not mutually 
exclusive, and, in practice, many individuals are subject to both, raising the possibility that such 
interactions could arise.  Indeed, several arguments as to how a higher minimum wage could enhance the 
effectiveness of the EITC have been put forward.  Although some are clearly invalid, others are possible 
but require empirical testing to which they have not yet been subjected.  
  One argument often made by minimum wage advocates is that a higher minimum wage is needed 
to prevent or mitigate the reduction in market wages associated with the labor supply response to a more 
generous EITC.  In the simplest model of the labor market—a competitive labor market with 
homogeneous labor—it is clearly wrong to argue that a higher minimum wage will enhance the 
effectiveness of the EITC.  In this setting, the EITC induces a labor supply increase among eligible 
individuals that, in the absence of a minimum wage, would be expected to result in a lower wage and 
higher employment for low-wage workers.  A minimum wage will reduce the extent to which the wage 
can fall in response to the increase in labor supply, but this will, in turn, reduce the job opportunities 
available to individuals who enter the labor market because of the EITC.  Indeed, in the extreme case in 
which all EITC eligible individuals are priced out of the labor market by the minimum wage, the EITC 
would not result in any change in employment, but only in an increase in unemployment.   4 
This intuition is illustrated in Figure 1.  In the absence of a minimum wage or an EITC, the 
equilibrium levels of employment (E0) and the market wage (W0) are determined by the intersection of 
the labor demand curve (L
D) and the labor supply curve (L
S).  If an EITC is implemented, which we 
oversimplify by modeling it as a simple tax credit,
8 then the labor supply curve shifts out to LS’, with 
equilibrium employment level E1 (and a lower market wage W1).  If a minimum wage of Wmin is 
introduced as well, the wage does not fall as far.  But the minimum wage reduces employment, generating 
excess labor supply E1 − Emin.  Indeed, if the minimum wage is set at W0, the EITC has no effect on the 
labor market, except to increase the excess of labor supply over the quantity of labor demanded to E1 − 
E0.  That is, the minimum wage inevitably leads to lower employment and a higher wage than would be 
the case with the EITC; the EITC simply determines the wage and employment level that would 
otherwise prevail. 
This analysis also undermines the argument that the minimum wage needs to keep up with 
inflation (whether by formal indexation or by more frequent increases) to maintain the effectiveness of 
the EITC.  Proponents of the minimum wage note that because the maximum credit that a family can 
receive is indexed to inflation while the minimum wage is not, a family that receives the EITC and for 
which earnings partly depend on minimum wage work will tend to face a declining real EITC payment 
when the real value of minimum wage declines.
9  However, this argument ultimately rests on the idea that 
a higher minimum wage—regardless of the generosity of the EITC—will help low-income families and 
thus is really an argument about the distributional effects of the minimum wage rather than an argument 
that a higher minimum wage increases the effectiveness of the EITC.  In this regard, the research 
literature fails to find positive distributional effects of the minimum wage,
10 suggesting that an EITC 
coupled with a higher minimum wage will likely lead to poor and low-income families being worse off 
than they would be with just the EITC.   
                                                 
8 The discussion ignores variation in the size of the credit with family income and family structure.  But the 
qualitative effect of increasing labor supply is captured in the figure.  
9 See Economic Policy Institute (2004). 
10 For a review of the evidence, see Neumark and Wascher (forthcoming). 5 
Thus, different arguments are needed to make the case that a higher minimum wage complements 
the EITC.  One route would be to drop the assumption of a competitive labor market.  For example, some 
researchers have claimed that low-skilled labor markets are better characterized by monopsony power 
stemming from labor market frictions.
11  In such a case, a minimum wage could increase employment and 
earnings of less-skilled workers, making more of them eligible for EITC payments or raising the size of 
the payments for which they are eligible.  However, our recent exhaustive review of the effects of 
minimum wages on employment concludes that the body of evidence is much more consistent with the 
competitive model of labor markets (Neumark and Wascher, 2007a). 
An alternative argument is that a higher minimum wage may reduce the distortionary impact of 
the EITC on labor supply.  In particular, a higher minimum wage enables a family to achieve the same 
level of income (earnings plus EITC) at the maximum EITC credit with a smaller EITC payment.  This, in 
turn, results in a lower marginal tax rate over the phase-out range of the credit, which could reduce the 
associated labor supply disincentives (Blank and Schmidt, 2001).  However, this argument is really about 
how the EITC parameters get set rather than about the minimum wage.  In particular, it does not imply 
that, for a given set of EITC parameters, a minimum wage makes the EITC more effective in reducing 
poverty or helping low-income families.  Rather, it suggests that with a higher minimum wage we might 
observe a different set of EITC parameters that have better distributional effects than the EITC parameters 
chosen when the minimum wage is lower.  As this hypothesis is not explicitly about minimum wage-
EITC interactions, testing it is beyond the scope of this paper.   
As noted in the Introduction, a more promising avenue for motivating interactions between 
minimum wages and the EITC in terms of their effects on low-income families is to allow for 
heterogeneity of individuals who would earn wages near the minimum if they worked.  Suppose that there 
are two types of workers: teenagers in middle-income families (ineligible for the EITC) with a low 
reservation wage; and poor single mothers who are eligible for the EITC, are slightly more productive 
than teenagers, and have significantly higher reservation wages, perhaps because of fixed costs of 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Manning (2003) and Machin and Manning (1994).     6 
working (e.g., making arrangements for child care).  In the absence of a minimum wage and with no 
EITC, the difference in reservation wages can lead to a situation in which the teenagers are employed 
while the single mothers are not.   
Suppose we just raise the minimum wage.  For a sufficiently high minimum some teenagers will 
become non-employed.  Demand will shift towards more-skilled single mothers, but the market wage (or 
the higher minimum) may still fall short of their reservation wage.  In this case, the minimum wage 
delivers no benefit to poor single mothers because none of them are drawn into the labor market.  If we 
just raise the EITC (in particular, the phase-in rate), the effective wage may still fall short of the 
reservation wage, in which case teenagers will continue to be employed (since their wage has not 
changed) and poor single mothers are again no better off.  However, a higher EITC coupled with a higher 
minimum wage may raise the effective wage above the reservation wage of single mothers, leading to 
more substitution of single mothers for teenagers, and hence better distributional effects of the EITC.
12   
The case for single mothers (assumed here to face a fixed cost of employment) is depicted in 
Figure 2.  The individual’s indifference curves between non-working time (t) and earnings (w⋅[T-t]) are 
given by the curved lines, while the budget constraint at the market wage is given by the solid line (with 
maximum earnings of wT).  Because of the fixed cost of employment, the individual does not work in the 
absence of a minimum wage or an EITC.  Moreover, neither the minimum wage in isolation (which shifts 
the budget constraint to the dotted and dashed line) nor the EITC in isolation (the dotted line) is sufficient 
to induce labor market entry.  In contrast, the combined policy of both a minimum wage and an EITC (the 
dashed line) raises the return to work by enough to induce labor market entry.  Of course, policymakers 
could devise a set of EITC parameters in isolation that would yield the same interior solution depicted in 
Figure 2.  But fiscal concerns or fears over introducing stronger distortions on the phase-out range may 
place constraints on setting EITC parameters in this way.  Indeed, as a consequence of the potential for 
labor supply disincentives with a very high EITC, it is not only possible that a higher minimum wage 
                                                 
12 If mothers are no more productive than teenagers, then although more mothers may be drawn into the labor 
market, employers are indifferent between the two groups and so demand does not shift toward them.  In this case, 
the qualitative effect would be the same, but it would be weaker.   7 
could enhance the positive distributional effects of the EITC, but also that the distributional effects of a 
minimum wage and a modest EITC are better than those of a high EITC that generates the same effective 
wage along the phase-in range.
13   
Figure 2 illustrates how a higher minimum wage could enhance the effectiveness of the EITC.  
However, it is also possible that a higher minimum wage will reduce the effectiveness of the EITC.  In 
particular, if the wages of those eligible for the EITC are already bound by the minimum wage, then a 
further increase in the wage floor will just reduce their employment relative to the case of an EITC in 
isolation (taking us back to a case similar to that depicted in Figure 1). 
In addition, low-skilled individuals who are not eligible for the EITC can take a double hit from a 
high minimum wage coupled with an EITC, with the minimum wage reducing their employment 
prospects via the higher wage imposed on employers, and the EITC reducing their employment prospects 
via the increased supply of EITC eligible individuals.  For example, in the model described above, the 
minimum wage plus EITC combination leads to more labor market entry by the higher-skilled workers—
single mothers—and hence more disemployment of the lower-skilled workers—teenagers, in that 
example, but more generally low-skilled individuals without children.  
The past decade is a propitious period in which to study the effects of policy interactions between 
the minimum wage and the EITC.  Paralleling the rapid proliferation of state EITCs has been a similar 
expansion in state minimum wages, with the number of states with minimum wages above the federal 
minimum rising to 29 (plus the District of Columbia) as of the beginning of 2007.  At the same time, 
focusing on the post-welfare reform period lets us abstract from major changes in work incentives 
associated with the transition from AFDC to TANF.  Although welfare policies continued to change after 
TANF was enacted in 1996, preliminary analyses indicated that key welfare reforms such as time limits 
and work requirements did not have discernible effects on the dependent variables we study, and so we 
focus on minimum wage-EITC interactions.
14 
                                                 
13 Estimates of the regression models described below can be used to simulate the distributional effects of alternative 
policy combinations and parameters—but such simulations are likely reliable only within the range of the data.   
14 This is not to say that the change from AFDC to TANF had no effects on labor market outcomes.  Our sample 8 
III. Data  
We combine data on wages, employment, hours, and earnings (individual and family) with state-
level information on minimum wages and earned income tax credits for the period 1996 to 2007.  The 
minimum wage data are compiled from annual summaries of federal and state labor legislation reported 
each year in the Department of Labor’s Monthly Labor Review.  Most state minimum wages equal or 
exceed the federal minimum wage, although some states have a minimum wage below the federal level, 
often applying to small groups of workers not covered by the federal law.  Because we do not have the 
detailed information on who is covered by state law and because coverage of the federal minimum wage 
is extensive, we simply use the higher of the state or federal minimum as the effective state minimum.   
The information on state EITCs comes from a series of reports published by the Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities.  State EITCs specify a percentage of the federal EITC that is paid to state taxpayers 
via the state income tax system, as a “supplement” to the federal EITC.  Our state EITC variable is this 
percentage.  In two states, this percentage varies with the level of income and/or with the number of 
children.  For Wisconsin, where the supplement varies with the number of children, we use the 
supplement for families with two children (14%).  Minnesota’s EITC is not specified as a simple 
percentage of the federal credit, so we use the reported average supplement of 33%.
15   Although the state 
credit is refundable in most states, a few states have a nonrefundable (or only partially refundable) credit 
and in a couple of states the recipient has a choice; for these latter states, we use the refundable rate on the 
presumption that most eligible families would prefer that rate.  (A refundable EITC gives money back to 
the family even if there is no tax liability, whereas a non-refundable EITC only reduces any existing tax 
liability.)  Over the sample period we use, the federal EITC was unchanged with a phase-in tax credit of 
40% for families with two or more children, and 34% for families with one child.  The federal EITC also 
provides a very small credit of 7.65% to those without children.
16   
                                                                                                                                                             
period begins in 1997 and thus covers the post-welfare reform period.  As a result, the welfare reform effects we 
can identify are mainly the effects of minor timing differences between the states and variation in the state 
policies adopted.  Some of these earlier results are described in Neumark and Wascher (2007b).   
15 See http://www.stateeitc.com.   
16 In addition to the phase-in rate, the EITC establishes a maximum credit (in 2007, $4,716 for families with two or 9 
We merge these state-level policy variables with data from CPS Annual Demographic Files 
(ADF).  The ADF files are used to construct individual-level measures of wages, employment, and hours, 
as well as demographic and human capital indicators.  In addition, we use the ADF files to construct 
family-level measures of earnings and the poverty line for each family.  Finally, we append to each record 
the state unemployment rate in each year to control for variation in economic conditions at the state-by-
year level.  The unemployment rate is potentially endogenous, but by using the state-wide unemployment 
rate (from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics) rather than a rate for groups more strongly affected 
by the minimum wage, we hope to capture the exogenous influence of changes in aggregate demand.
17   
IV. Methods 
We use a reduced-form approach to estimate the effects of the interactions between the EITC and 
minimum wages on labor market outcomes.  In principal, one could estimate a structural model of labor 
supply in the context of a non-linear budget constraint that incorporates changes in both the EITC and the 
minimum wage (as well as other policy changes).
18  However, a reduced-form approach allows us to more 
naturally extend the prior literature that focuses on the effects of the EITC on labor supply and poverty 
(e.g., Cancian and Levinson, 2005; Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Eissa and Hoynes, 2004; Neumark and 
Wascher, 2001) by expanding the specifications used in these studies to incorporate interactions between 
the EITC and the minimum wage.  In addition, many potentially eligible individuals have imperfect 
information about the EITC, and most workers are not able to freely choose their work hours over the 
course of the year (Liebman, 1998; Romich and Weisner, 2000), which may limit the appeal of using an 
approach based on utility maximization with respect to an explicit non-linear budget constraint.
19   
Nonetheless, it is clear that the structural and reduced-form approaches are complementary. 
                                                                                                                                                             
more children, $2,853 for families with one child, and $428 for those with no children), a “plateau” or income 
range over which the maximum benefit remains fixed (in 2007, for families with two or more children, from 
$11,791-$15,399), and a phase-out rate at which the credit is reduced as income rises further (currently 21.06% 
for families with two or more children). 
17 We also experimented with the inclusion of state real GDP growth per capita in the various specifications we 
estimate.  However, the estimated coefficient of this variable was never statistically significant (in contrast to the 
estimated coefficient of the unemployment rate), and its inclusion had no impact on the results, so we omit it in 
the specifications reported in the paper.   
18 A recent study using this approach is Bingley and Walker (2008). 
19 For example, Berube et al. (2002) note that two-thirds of EITC recipients use a tax preparer and hence likely do 10 
We estimate models for employment, hours, wages, earnings, and family earnings relative to 
poverty thresholds for a variety of demographic and skill groups.
20  The earnings estimates are 
unconditional rather than conditional on employment, so that the estimates reflect changes on both the 
extensive (employment) and intensive (hours of work if employed) margins of work, as well as changes 
in wages.  We look at hours conditional on work to focus on the intensive margin, for which—at least for 
women—the predicted effects of the EITC are different than for employment.  All specifications are 
estimated at the individual level, with standard errors adjusted to account for non-independence among 
observations within the same state and over time.
21   
We begin by focusing on the effects of the EITC.  When we study women, we estimate models 
for employment, hours, and earnings, as well as whether families’ earnings are above or below the 
poverty line (or other thresholds).  The strongest prediction is for employment, which theory says will be 
increased by the EITC.  However, estimates of the effect of the EITC on overall individual earnings 
provide a useful summary statistic for changes along various dimensions (including wages), while family 
earnings are of interest because the family is typically the unit of interest in anti-poverty policy.   
In particular, we estimate the following baseline model:  
(1)  , 2 1 ist t s ist ist st st ist M G X Kids EITC EITC Y ε ν μ λ β β α + + + + ⋅ + + =     
where Y is the dependent variable, EITC is the state EITC supplement expressed in percentage terms, and 
Kids is a dummy variable indicating the presence of dependent children age 18 or under in the home 
(which is what is measured in the CPS).  The matrix X includes main effects for the number of children, 
as well as a large set of controls discussed below.  Gs and Mt are vectors of state and year fixed effects, 
                                                                                                                                                             
not know the details of the EITC, Leigh (2005) notes that low education and low language skills among many 
eligibles likely contribute to poor information, and Rothstein (2008) concludes that individuals respond to changes 
in average rather than marginal tax rates induced by variation in the EITC.  In addition, it is undoubtedly difficult 
for individuals to predict how their particular labor supply choices during the year will affect their EITC 
payments, given that most EITC recipients take their full credit for the previous year when they file their taxes. 
20 Note that we focus on earnings and not income.  Although it is possible to measure other sources of pre-tax 
income in the CPS data we use, there is no information on EITC payments received or taxes paid.  In addition, we 
are more interested in how the EITC affects labor market incentives and hence earnings, while recognizing that 
this means that in some cases we understate the gains (or overstate the losses) from the EITC.   
21 Specifically, each observation comes from a particular state and year.  However, we cluster the data at the state 
level to compute standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and arbitrary correlations across individuals in the 
same state either contemporaneously or over time (Bertrand, et al., 2004). 11 
included to control for other differences across states that might be correlated with policy differences, and 
for changes in other factors over time that are common to states (such as those generated by federal 
policies) but that might be correlated with the policies we study.  Finally, the ‘i,’ ‘s,’ and ‘t’ subscripts 
denote individuals, states, and years, respectively.   
  Some details of this specification merit additional explanation.  First, because the EITC is much 
more generous for families with children, we view β2 as especially indicative of the effect of the EITC on 
labor market outcomes.  One might interpret β1 as the effect of the EITC on those without children.  
However, because the model does not include a full set of state-by-year interactions (in which case β1
 
would be unidentified), we cannot be entirely sure that this parameter reflects the effects of the EITC 
rather than the effects of shocks specific to state and year cells that are correlated with EITC.
   In that 
sense, our estimating equation can be thought of as a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimator, in 
which β2 identifies the effect of the EITC from the differential effect for those with and without children.  
We also verify that the estimates of β2 are robust to more flexible specifications that include either state-
specific time trends or a full set of state-by-year interactions.   
Second, X includes as controls: dummy variables for education (high school dropout, high school 
degree, some college, bachelor’s degree or higher); dummy variables for number of children as well as 
the number of children under age 6 (all possible values); dummy variables for marital status (never 
married, married spouse present, married spouse absent, and divorced, widowed, or separated); dummy 
variables for black or Hispanic; age and its square; and the state unemployment rate.  In addition, the 
model includes a full set of interactions between Kids and both the year dummy variables and the state 
dummy variables.  These interactions are intended to capture changes across time in the relationship 
between the presence of children in the home and labor market outcomes, as well as differences across 
states; for example, these interactions may capture the effects of changes in state welfare policies.
22  For 
                                                 
22 When these interactions were excluded, the results were sometimes sensitive to how we controlled for the number 
of children and their ages (using the highly flexible manner just described or a more restrictive specification).  
However, when these interactions were included, the results were very stable.  12 
some samples, some of these controls drop out (e.g., some of the marital status controls when we study 
single women).  
When we study the effects of the EITC on low-skilled individuals without children (who we 
loosely classify as “ineligible”), an interaction with Kids is clearly inappropriate.  Instead, we identify the 
effect of the EITC on this group from the difference in labor market outcomes between those with higher 
and lower skills.  We classify individuals as having higher skills if they have at least some college and as 
having lower skills if they have a high school degree or less.  We also estimate alternative specifications 
that focus instead on low-skilled blacks or Hispanics, who tend to have even lower wages and hence are 
likely to be more adversely affected by an outward supply shift induced by the EITC—especially, 
perhaps, when coupled with a higher minimum wage (in specifications discussed later).  For the unskilled 
ineligibles, the strongest prediction is that a higher EITC reduces the wage.  If the substitution effect 
dominates the income effect or if the decline in the wage increases the extent to which these workers are 
bound by the minimum wage, we might also expect declines in hours or employment.  Thus, our 
specification becomes: 
(2)  , ' 2 1 ist t s ist ist st st ist M G X Lowskill EITC EITC Y ε ν μ λ β β α + + + + ⋅ + + =     
where the vector of controls X’ excludes the variables related to children and includes the low-skill 
indicator, and β2 captures the effect of the EITC on low-skilled individuals.
23   
  After estimating the effects of the EITC, we move on to specifications that are augmented to 
allow for interactions between the EITC and the minimum wage.  For women, we estimate models for the 
same outcomes, asking whether the effects of the EITC discussed above vary with the level of the 
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23 An alternative approach would be to estimate this model with female labor supply measures on the right-hand 
side, and instrument for them with variation in the EITC.  In this context, equation (2) can be interpreted as a 
reduced-form specification for wages and other labor market outcomes. 13 
where MW is the log of the minimum wage, and δ2 identifies how variation in the minimum wage changes 
the effect of the EITC on those with children relative to those without.  Again, we verify the robustness of 
the results for the policy variables interacted with Kids (the coefficients β2, γ2, and δ2) to the inclusion of 
state-specific linear trends or a full set of state-year interactions.  Reflecting earlier findings indicating 
that the effects of minimum wages take some time to become fully apparent (Baker, et al., 1999), we view 
it as desirable to include both contemporaneous and lagged values of the minimum wage.
   However, to 
simplify the specification, we specify the minimum wage variable in these models as the average of the 
current and lagged (one year) minimum wage.  In addition, we demean the policy variables (EITC and 
MW) in this specification so that the main effects of the EITC and the minimum wage that we report are 
effectively evaluated at the sample means and hence are comparable to those from specification (1).   
For individuals without children at home, the higher minimum wage may mute the reduction in 
wages caused by the general equilibrium effects of the EITC, but this would lead us to expect larger 
declines in hours or employment.  Thus, for these individuals we estimate models for employment, hours, 
wages, and earnings (as a summary measure) using an augmented version of equation (2): 
(4) 
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In this specification, δ2 identifies how variation in the minimum wage alters the effect of the 
EITC on low-skilled childless individuals relative to high-skilled childless individuals.
24   
V. Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 1A-1C report descriptive statistics of key variables at the individual and family levels, 
including those for the outcomes we study.  The tables cover the period 1997-2006 and present statistics 
for a variety of groups included in our analysis, including single and married women between the ages of 
18 and 45 (Table 1A), childless individuals between the ages of 18 and 35 (Table 1B), and families with a 
                                                 
24 Note that a higher EITC should reduce wages of the less-skilled whether or not they have children.  But the 
predicted labor supply effects are different for the childless. 14 
head between the ages of 18 and 45 (Table 1C).
25  As indicated in the top panel of Table 1A, about 45% 
of single women (which includes women who have never married as well as those who are divorced, 
widowed, or separated) have at least one child at home, and 22% have more than one child.  These 
percentages are somewhat higher for less-educated or minority single women, although still lower than 
the percentages for less-educated married women.  Single women are also more likely to be black than 
less-educated married women in this age range, while the average age in each category is just under 30.  
With regard to education, shown in the next panel, single black or Hispanic women are somewhat less 
likely to have completed high school than single white women (and are labeled high school dropouts, 
although some of them may complete high school later), and are somewhat less likely to have a college 
degree.
26 
Average economic outcomes for these groups of women are shown in the remaining panels.  For 
the sample of single women as a whole, the average employment rate is 79% and is higher for women 
without children than for women with children.  Among employed single women, total hours average 
1,633 hours per year, and log earnings average 7.53.  Both of these figures are again higher for childless 
women than for women with children.  Looking across the columns, less-educated and minority women 
have lower employment rates and lower earnings than single women overall, although employed minority 
women work more slightly more hours.  On the other hand, less-educated married women without 
children are more likely to be employed, work somewhat more hours, and have higher earnings than less-
educated or minority single women without children.      
Table 1B presents summary statistics for childless men and women and for several subsets of this 
group.  In particular, we compare economic outcomes for three less-educated groups—all those with at 
most a high school degree, then just low-skilled minorities, and then low-skilled minority single men—to 
                                                 
25 Table 1C also includes unrelated individuals (including unrelated subfamilies) living in others’ households or 
primary individuals in their own households.  Together, these three types of families are used by the Census 
Bureau in measuring poverty at the family level.  (See http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032007/pov/povnotes.htm, 
viewed July 15, 2008.) 
26 The education classifications are based on education attained and whether the person reports a high school 
diploma or GED.  We do not distinguish between the latter two cases, although there is evidence suggesting that 
this distinction is important for employment outcomes (e.g., Cameron and Heckman, 1993).  Separate information 
on diploma and GED holders is first available in the CPS in 1998. 15 
each other and to those with some college or higher.  Average economic outcomes are worse for the less-
educated groups, with lower employment rates, hours, wages, and earnings.  In addition, employment 
rates, wages, and earnings are lower for less-educated minorities than for the sample of less-educated 
individuals as a whole.   
Table 1C presents summary statistics at the family level.  About 46% of families (which includes 
unrelated individuals) are headed by a woman, while 45% of families consist of married couples.  Within 
the group of families headed by single women, 42% have children at home.  About 22% of the sample of 
single women family heads is black and 13% is Hispanic; the percentage black is noticeably higher than 
for all families, while the percentage Hispanic is slightly lower.  Among single women family heads, 54% 
have completed at most a high school education, while 13% have not completed high school; these 
percentages are not much different than for the sample of family heads as a whole.  In contrast, the 
economic outcomes differ noticeably across family types.  About 20% of families with heads between the 
ages of 18 and 45 had earnings below the poverty line, and about 13% had earnings less than ½ the 
poverty line (sometimes referred to as “extreme poverty”).  However, the percentages with low levels of 
earnings rise sharply for families headed by single women, and even more so for families headed by less-
educated or minority women.  Moreover, the differences are especially large for female-headed families 
with children: 55% of families headed by a less-educated or minority woman had earnings below the 
poverty line and more than one-third had earnings below ½ the poverty line.   
The policy variables are shown in Figures 3 through 6.  As indicated in Figure 3, the prevalence 
of state minimum wages and state EITC supplements increased over our sample period.  The percentage 
of families residing in states with an EITC rose from 17% in 1997 to 32% in 2006, while the percentage 
of families in states with a minimum wage higher than the federal level rose from 18% in 1998 to about 
50% in 2006, with especially sharp increases in 2005 and 2006.  In addition, state EITCs and state 
minimum wages have become more generous over time.  For example, the average size of the supplement 16 
in states with an EITC rose from 8% in 1997 to more than 15% in 2006 (Figure 4),
27 while the level of the 
minimum wage in states where the minimum was above the federal level moved up from just over $5 per 
hour in 1997 to about $6.50 per hour in 2006 (Figure 5); in contrast, the federal hourly minimum wage 
was raised to $5.15 in late 1997 and was held at that level through 2006.     
Figure 6 presents a scatter plot of state minimum wages and EITC supplements in 2006.  As 
indicated by the upward-sloping regression line, states with higher minimum wages tended to have a more 
generous EITC supplement.  However, the dispersion of points around the line is considerable, suggesting 
that states varied considerably in their use of these policies.  In particular, some states implemented high 
minimum wages but low (or no) EITC supplements, and others had high EITC supplements but low 
minimum wages.  We use this variation to identify how the interaction of state minimum wages and state 
EITC supplements influenced economic outcomes at the individual and family level.    
Effects of the EITC on Employment, Hours, and Earnings 
We begin with regression estimates of the effects of the EITC on employment, hours, and 
earnings.  Table 2 reports results for various groups of women expected to be differentially affected by 
the EITC (estimates of equation (1)).  Column (1) reports the relevant coefficient estimates for a sample 
that includes all single women between the ages of 18 and 45.  As indicated in the second row in each 
panel, the coefficient on the EITC variable itself is generally small and insignificant, suggesting that the 
EITC has negligible effects on labor market outcomes for single women without children.  More 
important, the coefficient on the EITC-kids interaction (the first row) indicates that the EITC has a 
positive and significant (at the 10% level) effect on the employment and earnings of single women with 
children.  The 0.18 estimate for employment implies that a 10% EITC supplement boosts the probability 
of employment among single mothers by 1.8 percentage points relative to single women without children, 
while the 1.80 estimate for earnings implies that a 10% supplement raises their earnings by 18%.  These 
                                                 
27 Over 80% of the observations on families in states that supplement the EITC were from states with a refundable 
EITC, and in almost all cases the EITC was fully refundable.     17 
results are generally consistent with previous research on the EITC (e.g., Hoffman and Seidman, 2003) 
indicating that the EITC boosts employment and earnings of single mothers.   
The next two columns narrow the sample to two groups that are often considered likely to be 
more strongly influenced by the EITC—less-educated women and minority women.  These individuals 
are likely to reap the most from the EITC because their earnings are low and thus less likely to be in the 
plateau or phase-out range where the EITC can generate incentives to work less.  Consistent with these 
priors, the coefficient on the EITC-kids interaction is positive for employment and earnings and larger in 
each case than for the broader sample of single women.  Although the standard errors also become larger, 
the estimated effects are statistically significant at the 5% or 10% level for less-educated women.  In 
contrast, the hours effects (conditional on employment) are small and statistically insignificant.   
Finally, the last column reports results for less-educated married women.  For many in this group, 
family earnings are above the maximum EITC income threshold and at a level where we would not 
expect the EITC to have an effect on their labor market outcomes.  However, there may be others who are 
in the plateau or phase-out range where the EITC is predicted to reduce hours worked (and perhaps 
employment).  The results are generally consistent with this expectation, pointing to negative effects of 
the EITC on employment, hours, and earnings for married women with children, although none of the 
estimates are statistically significant.  Clearly, though, the results are substantially different from those for 
single women, confirming what theory would lead us to expect, and hence bolstering a causal 
interpretation of the estimates for single women.
28   
A potential side effect of the EITC is that the positive supply response for eligible mothers may 
lead to negative spillover effects on other less-skilled individuals who are ineligible for the EITC but who 
compete for jobs with the new labor force entrants.  Table 3A presents results for different groups of such 
individuals (estimates of equation (2)).  In this specification, we identify the effect of the EITC from an 
interaction between the EITC supplement and an indicator for low skills, which we define as having at 
                                                 
28 These findings parallel those in Eissa and Hoynes (2004), although Eissa and Hoynes sometimes find statistically 
stronger evidence that the EITC reduces labor market participation of less-educated married women.   18 
most a high-school degree.  To focus in on those individuals more likely to be substitutes in production 
for women benefiting from the EITC, we limit the sample to men and women between the ages of 18 and 
35.  We first estimate the model for all individuals in this age range.  We then restrict the treatment group 
to less-skilled minorities, and finally to less-skilled minority single men (keeping the control group the 
same).  This last treatment group is of interest for at least two reasons.  First, single men may be less 
skilled or less productive than otherwise comparable married men (e.g., Korenman and Neumark, 1991).  
And second, single, less-skilled, and especially minorities, have been the focus of policy proposals 
regarding extensions of the EITC (e.g., Gitterman et al., 2007). 
The first column of the table presents the effects of the EITC on the wages, employment, hours 
(conditional), and earnings of less-educated men and women without children at home.  The estimates 
always indicate negative effects of the EITC, although only the estimated effect on hours (conditional on 
employment) is statistically significant.  For less-educated blacks and Hispanics, reported in column (2), 
the results are sharper and somewhat different.  In particular, the estimated effects of the EITC on 
employment and earnings are negative and statistically significant, and the point estimates are larger than 
in column (1), implying that this group is more adversely affected by the EITC.  There is no evidence of 
an effect on hours conditional on employment, while the estimated negative effect on wages is at best 
marginally significant.  Finally, as indicated in column (3), the results for less-educated single minority 
men are similar to and stronger than those in column (2), with the estimates pointing to negative effects of 
the EITC on wages, employment, and earnings.
29 
Table 3B presents some additional evidence on spillover effects from the EITC to childless, less-
skilled individuals.
30  In particular, we might expect the spillover effects to be stronger in labor markets 
                                                 
29 We also estimated similar models for the low-skilled only, dropping the interactions in equation (2).  In this case, 
the estimates did not reflect the predicted negative wage or employment effects (with all of the estimates near zero 
and statistically insignificant), suggesting that using the high-skilled group captures other economic shocks across 
states and years.  We do note, however, that Leigh (2007) reports wage regression estimates for the low-skilled 
only that are consistent with the predicted negative effects of the EITC on the unskilled, although the sample 
period and specification differ in other ways.  Rothstein (2008) explores this issue more fully in the context of 
federal increases in the EITC in the 1990s, noting the importance of controlling for demand shifts to detect the 
adverse effects of the EITC on wages.  
30 We are grateful to Jim Poterba for suggesting this analysis.   19 
where more women enter the labor force in response to a more generous EITC.  In Table 3A, differences 
in spillovers across labor markets are assumed to be related to variation in the size of the EITC 
supplement.  However, the supply response is also a function of how many women are eligible for the 
EITC.  We measure the proportion of women likely to be eligible for the EITC in two ways.  Our first 
measure is the percentage of tax returns in each state that claimed the federal EITC.
31  Our second 
measure is the estimated share of single mothers in the state.  Although neither measure directly 
corresponds to the share of EITC-eligible women, both should be highly correlated with that share.     
We augment equation (2) to include an interaction between the EITC effect for the low-skilled 
and these shares.  To avoid endogeneity stemming from the fact that the childless can file for the EITC, or 
from an EITC effect on household structure, we drop our first sample year (1997) from the analysis, and 
use the share in 1997.
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where Share97 is one of our measures of EITC eligibility.  Note that the main effects of this share are 
capture by the state dummy variables.  The parameter of most interest is β3. 
  Estimates for the sample of 18-35 year-old childless individuals are reported in Table 3B.  The 
results indicate that the spillover effects of the EITC on low-skilled, childless individuals are larger in 
states where a greater proportion of women are potentially affected by the EITC.  In the wage regression 
estimates shown in column (1), for example, the estimated coefficient of the interaction between the EITC 
variable, the low-skill indicator, and the share of EITC filers is negative and significant, implying that the 
negative effect of the EITC on the wages of childless, low-skilled men and women is stronger in states 
where a higher percentage of tax filers claimed the EITC.  Similar statistically significant negative 
interactions are evident in the regressions for employment and earnings.  As indicated in column (2), we 
                                                 
31 These data are derived from the Internal Revenue Service’s Stakeholder Partnerships, Education, and 
Communication (IRS-SPEC) database.  We are grateful to Elizabeth Kneebone from the Brookings Metropolitan 
Policy Program for providing us with the state tabulations.  
32 The mean filing share across states in 1997 is 0.16, ranging from 0.09 in Alaska to 0.32 in Mississippi.  The mean 
share of the adult population that consists of single mothers (with children at home) is 0.07, ranging from 0.05 in 
Maine to 0.10 in Mississippi. 20 
also find evidence of negative interactions using the proportion of single mothers in the state as the share 
variable.
33  The evidence that the effects of the EITC are more adverse when a larger share of the 
population is potentially affected by the EITC strengthens the conclusion that we are detecting spillover 
effects of the EITC.   
In Table 4, we turn to the effects of the EITC on the total earnings of families with heads between 
the ages of 18 and 45, which provides a way of aggregating the effects for men and women shown in the 
previous tables.  Because we are interested in how the EITC influences the lower tail of the earnings 
distribution, we focus on two metrics that are illustrative of these effects: the probability that a family’s 
earnings are below the level of income associated with the poverty line, and the probability that family 
earnings are below ½ the poverty line.  As indicated in the first column, for the sample of all families, the 
EITC appears to be associated with reductions in the proportion of families with very low earnings.  
However, the estimated coefficients of the EITC-kids interactions are relatively small and not statistically 
significant.  The results are somewhat stronger when the sample is restricted to families headed by single 
females (column (2)), or to families headed by less-educated single females (column (3)); in these cases, 
the estimated coefficient of the EITC-kids interaction is significant at the 10% level for the probability 
that families are below ½ of the poverty line.  For families headed by minority single women, the 
evidence is weaker.  Overall, however, the evidence is in the direction of previous research findings that 
the EITC is effective at boosting the earnings of very poor families.   
Interactions between the EITC and the Minimum Wage  
We next turn to evidence on our central question regarding the effects of interactions between the 
EITC and minimum wages.  As in Tables 2-4, we focus on the three main groups likely to be affected by 
the EITC.  As noted earlier, for women who are eligible for the EITC, the disemployment effects of a 
higher minimum wage could reduce the positive employment effect of the EITC.  Alternatively, the 
                                                 
33 We also estimated these models for the other subsamples considered in Table 3A.  The qualitative conclusions 
based on the point estimates were fairly similar, with one exception.  In particular, for low-skilled minorities, the 
point estimates did not suggest that a higher share filing or a higher share of single mothers is associated with 
sharper negative effects of the EITC on wages.  This may reflect the lower wages of minorities, implying that 
more of them are bound by the minimum wage so that the wage cannot decline as much in response to the labor 
supply increases induced by the EITC. 21 
interaction for these women could be positive, because a higher minimum wage makes the EITC more 
valuable for eligible families.  In contrast, for groups not likely to be eligible for the EITC, or eligible for 
only a small credit, a high minimum wage coupled with an EITC could be a particularly bad combination, 
with the minimum wage reducing their employment prospects via the higher wage floor imposed on 
employers, and the EITC reducing their employment prospects via the increased supply of eligible 
women entering the labor market.  For single women and families, this latter effect pertains to childless 
women and thus would be captured by the coefficient on the EITC-minimum wage interaction.  For 
childless low-skilled individuals, this latter effect pertains to the triple interaction between the EITC, the 
minimum wage, and the low-skill indicator.       
Table 5 reports results for employment and log earnings of single women.  As shown in the first 
column of the top panel, the EITC effect on employment is positive and significant for single women with 
children, similar to the results we reported in Table 2.  Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction term 
between the minimum wage, the EITC, and children is positive and significant, indicating that a higher 
minimum wage amplifies the positive labor supply response of the EITC for single mothers.  The results 
are even stronger for less-educated and minority mothers (columns (2) and (3)).  In contrast, for single 
women without children, the coefficient on the EITC-minimum wage interaction is negative, and notably 
so for minorities and less-educated women, albeit not statistically significant. 
The effects on earnings are shown in the bottom panel.  Consistent with the positive effects on 
employment, both the EITC variable and the EITC-minimum wage interaction have a positive and 
significant effect on the earnings of women with children, with larger effects evident for the samples 
restricted to minorities or less-educated women than for the sample as a whole.  This suggests that the 
combination of an EITC and a higher minimum wage may be especially powerful in raising the earnings 
of low-skilled single mothers.  However, these specifications also suggest that the positive labor supply 
response of single mothers eligible for the EITC may reduce earnings and employment opportunities for 
other subsets of the population.  In particular, the results in this table indicate that the combination of an 
EITC and a high minimum wage reduces employment and earnings among single women without 22 
children, especially for minority women.  Below, after presenting some additional analyses on these 
spillover effects, we provide some calculations that provide a better sense of how to interpret the 
coefficient magnitudes in Table 5.  
Table 6 reports results for unskilled childless individuals.  In principle, a higher minimum wage 
coupled with an EITC could cut in different ways for this group of individuals.  On the one hand, a high 
minimum wage that leads to more labor market entry among women eligible for the EITC could put 
additional downward pressure on wages for those earning more than the minimum wage.  On the other 
hand, a high minimum wage could create a floor below which wages cannot fall despite the increased 
labor supply of women, in which case the combined policies might reduce employment more strongly.  
As shown in Table 6, the evidence is more consistent with the latter type of effect.
34  The effects of the 
EITC on wages (shown in the top panel) are negative, but there is no evidence that this adverse effect is 
compounded by a higher minimum wage, as the estimated interactive coefficients for low-skilled 
childless individuals are positive and insignificant.
35  In contrast, the point estimates of the triple 
interaction (MW × EITC × low-skill) for employment are all negative, and larger and statistically 
significant when we focus on minorities and single males (in columns (2) and (3)).  Coupled with the 
negative effects of the EITC on employment of the less-skilled (in the first row of the middle panel), these 
results imply that a higher minimum wage exacerbates the negative impact of the EITC.  Finally, as 
indicated in the lower panel, the presence of either an EITC or a minimum wage tends to reduce the 
relative earnings of the low-skilled, and these effects are heightened when both policies are in effect—
with a statistically significant interaction evident for blacks or Hispanics and the narrower subgroup of 
minority single males.   
Teenagers are another group for which the combination of a high minimum wage and an EITC 
may produce adverse effects.  Previous researchers have found evidence of substitutability between 
                                                 
34 We do not report hours effects since there was little evidence of EITC effects on hours (conditional on 
employment) in Table 3. 
35 This finding appears consistent with the only other instance we are aware of in which research has explored the 
effects of minimum wage-EITC interactions.  In particular, in his analysis of how the EITC affects wages of low-
skilled workers, Leigh (2007) notes that he estimated models with minimum wage-EITC interactions and found 
that a higher minimum wage did little to influence the effects of the EITC.   23 
women and youth (e.g., Grant and Hamermesh, 1981), raising the possibility than an EITC-induced 
outward supply shift for women with children may depress labor market opportunities for teenagers.  As 
for other groups, this substitutability could lead to downward pressure on wages or reduced employment.  
To investigate this possibility, we estimate models for 16-19 year-old males and for 16-19 year-
old females that, similarly to those presented above, allow for interactions between the EITC and 
minimum wages.  Because limiting the sample to teenagers substantially reduces the number of 
observations in the ADF dataset, we switch to the CPS monthly outgoing rotation group (ORG) files for 
this part of the analysis.  This requires some differences in specification from the annual regressions 
shown in previous tables in that we create a monthly minimum wage variable that captures the exact 
timing of minimum wage changes,
36 and we include a set of dummy variables for calendar year and 
month and a set of state-specific time trends.  In addition, reflecting the time period covered by the 
regularly monthly CPS surveys, our analysis is limited to employment, wages, and earnings, all of which 
refer to a one-week period during the survey month.  The sample period for these regressions extends 
from January 1997 to December 2007.   
The results for teenage males are presented in Table 7A, while those for females are shown in 
Table 7B; we show results separately for all races, all non-black, non-Hispanic individuals, and blacks or 
Hispanics.  Because previous analyses of the youth labor market have often focused solely on the effects 
of minimum wages and because teenagers are not generally eligible for the EITC, the first column in each 
pair shows the coefficients from a standard regression of employment, wages, or earnings on the 
minimum wage; the second column in each set then adds in an EITC variable and the EITC-minimum 
wage interaction.
37  In the standard regression for male teenagers (Table 7A), the minimum wage has a 
negative effect on the employment rate of all teenage males, a positive effect on wages, and a negative 
effect on weekly earnings, consistent with much earlier research.
38  And, as can be seen in columns (3) 
and (5), the minimum wage has more adverse effects on blacks and Hispanics than on whites.  Adding in 
                                                 
36 The EITC supplements refer to an entire tax year, and thus have the same value in every month within the year. 
37 Consistent with our analysis using the ADF dataset, the minimum wage is defined as the average (in logs) of the 
current minimum wage and the minimum wage lagged one year (i.e. twelve months). 
38 See Neumark and Wascher (forthcoming). 24 
variables for the EITC and EITC-minimum wage interaction provides weak evidence that the 
combination of a high EITC and high minimum wage leads to a larger loss of earnings for male teens, 
mainly by reducing their employment opportunities.  However, most of the key coefficients in this 
specification are not statistically significant. 
Clearer evidence of substitutability between low-skilled adult women and teenagers can be seen 
in the regressions for female teenagers (Table 7B).  For the minimum wage variable alone, the patterns 
are broadly similar to those seen for male teens, with reductions in employment rates and earnings, but 
increases in wages for those who remained employed.  However, the second specification shows large 
negative coefficients on the interaction terms in every case, with most of them statistically significant.  
Evidently, the additional increase in labor supply among adult women in response to the combination of a 
high minimum wage and generous EITC leads to noticeable reductions in both the employment rates and 
wages of female teenagers, thereby reducing their earnings sharply.  This suggests that the types of jobs 
taken by low-skilled adult women drawn into the workforce by the EITC are similar to those typically 
filled by teenage women.    
In Table 8, we ask how minimum wages influence the effects of the EITC on family earnings 
relative to the poverty line or ½ the poverty line.  Consistent with the results we presented above, we find 
that the EITC, by itself, tends to reduce the likelihood that families are poor, and even more so below ½ 
of the poverty line.  However, the interaction effects are particularly striking.  Most important, the 
combination of an EITC and a higher minimum wage tends to have a strong beneficial effect on the 
earnings of families with children, especially for those headed by single women, who, as we have seen, 
increase their participation in the labor market in response to this set of policies.  In contrast, to the extent 
that we are willing to interpret the “main” EITC-minimum wage interaction as causal, the positive 
estimated coefficient of this interaction suggests that the added inflow of single mothers stemming from a 
high EITC/ high minimum wage policy tends to reduce earnings (and hence depress family earnings) for 
other low-skilled individuals; note that this latter effect is larger when we focus on less-educated single 
females, but not when we focus on minority women. 25 
To help interpret the coefficient estimates, Tables 9-11 present implied effects of various policy 
combinations on a subset of the labor market outcomes we considered in the previous tables; here we 
focus on the groups and outcomes for which we found the strongest evidence of effects of the EITC.  For 
example, in the first column of Table 9, we show the effect of introducing a 10% state EITC supplement 
on the employment status of single women under three different values of the minimum wage—a wage 
floor set at the sample mean, a minimum wage set 10% above the sample mean, and a minimum wage set 
25% above the sample mean.  As indicated in the top panel, introducing a 10% EITC supplement in a 
state where the minimum wage is set to the sample average increases employment among single women 
with children but has little effect on the employment of childless women.  With a higher minimum wage, 
the effects of the EITC on the employment of single mothers become more strongly positive, while the 
effects on the employment of single women without children are essentially unchanged.  The difference in 
the responses of women with and without children to the EITC is statistically significant in all cases, as is 
the change in the relative response of women with children when the minimum wage is raised.  Thus, 
these comparisons clearly indicate that the EITC and the minimum wage interact in a way that induces a 
larger absolute and relative labor supply response among women with children when the minimum wage 
is high.     
The remaining two columns show corresponding effects for low-skilled and minority single 
women.  The results are slightly stronger for these two groups, with a larger positive labor supply 
response for single women with children, especially among minorities.  In addition, the effect of the EITC 
on less-skilled or minority women without children becomes negative at higher levels of the minimum 
wage, although these estimates are not statistically significant.  In any event, the differences in the 
interactions between the EITC and the minimum wage for single women with and without children are 
significantly different for all three samples, suggesting that a higher minimum wage boosts the positive 
effects of the EITC on the employment of women with children who are relatively more likely to be 
eligible for generous EITC payments.   26 
In Table 10, we present the implied effects of a similar range of policy combinations on the 
earnings of childless individuals.  In this case, we differentiate between the effects of policy on the 
earnings of lower-skilled/minority and higher-skilled individuals.  As indicated in the top panel, the 
combination of a 10% EITC supplement and a minimum wage set at its sample mean leads to a small loss 
in earnings among the low-skilled, although the effect is only significant for the estimates in columns (2) 
and (3).  However, the difference between the effects on low-skilled vs. high-skilled individuals indicates 
more strongly that the EITC reduces the relative earnings of low-skilled childless individuals; moreover, 
this relative earnings effect is negative for low-skilled childless individuals at each value of the minimum 
wage shown in the table, and is statistically significant for the two estimates for low-skilled minorities.
39  
In addition, a higher minimum wage strengthens the negative EITC earnings effects for the less-skilled, 
both absolutely, and relative to higher-skilled childless individuals.  The evidence for the interaction 
effect on earnings of low-skilled vs. high-skilled childless minorities is statistically significant at the 5% 
level for men and women combined, as well as for single men; in general, it is these relative effects on 
which we focus in this paper, given that the estimated “effects” for the high-skilled control group may 
reflect other influences correlated with the policy variation we study.   
Table 11 shows the effects of these various policy combinations on family earnings relative to the 
two poverty thresholds we considered.  As suggested by the results in Table 8, the top panel of Table 11 
indicates that a 10% EITC implemented at the average value of the minimum wage tends to reduce the 
incidence of poverty among families with children (and relative to childless families).  These beneficial 
effects are especially pronounced for families headed by a single female, and the difference between the 
effects for single mothers and single women without children is statistically significant for the proportions 
                                                 
39 To clarify this calculation, in the top three rows of Table 10, the estimate shown for “Low-skill” is the sum of the 
(EITC × low-skill) and EITC coefficient estimates in the bottom panel of Table 6, multiplied by 0.1; the estimate 
shown for “High-skill” is the EITC coefficient estimate from that same panel of Table 6, also multiplied by 0.1; 
and the estimate shown for “Difference” is the difference between the low-skill and high-skill estimates.  When 
these are evaluated at a higher minimum wage, the corresponding coefficients for the EITC-minimum wage 
interactions multiplied by the minimum wage increase are added.  Thus, for example, the 0.030 estimate for 
“High-skill” in the second panel of column (1) is calculated by adding the 0.50 coefficient estimate on EITC in 
column (1) of the bottom panel of Table 6 to −2.01× 0.1 (the coefficient on MW × EITC multiplied by the 
increase in the minimum wage), and then multiplying this sum by 0.1 (the size of the EITC supplement). 27 
with earnings less than ½ the poverty line (column (4)).  Moreover, at higher levels of the minimum 
wage, these beneficial effects become noticeably larger.  As indicated in column (4), for example, a 10% 
EITC supplement reduces the proportion of single mothers with earnings below ½ the poverty line by 
0.0309 at an average level of the minimum wage, and by 0.0491 with a minimum wage 25% above the 
average.  The difference in these effects (−0.0182) is statistically significant.  In contrast, the estimates 
suggest that a combination of a higher minimum wage and a generous EITC supplement tends to increase 
the proportion of childless families with earnings below the poverty line.  Our strongest conclusion from 
the estimates in Table 11, however, is that a higher minimum wage does appear to increase the likelihood 
that the EITC lifts families with children out of extreme poverty. 
Finally, we assessed the robustness of our conclusions on EITC-minimum wage interactions in 
two other ways not described in the tables.  First, to check whether the estimated interactions were simply 
picking up omitted nonlinearities in the main policy effects, we re-estimated the specifications adding 
quadratic terms in all of the policy variables except for the EITC-minimum wage interactions (including, 
in equation (3), for example, the main policy effects as well as their interaction with the dummy variable 
for children in the home).  The estimated EITC-minimum wage interactions were very similar, and the 
evidence was in some cases statistically stronger.  Second, to check whether our identification was 
coming from the linear restrictions on the main and interactive effects, we created four indicators for each 
policy, with the first designating state/years for which no policy (or in the case of the minimum wage, a 
minimal policy) was in effect and the latter three designating state/years with low, medium, and high 
versions of the policy (roughly the eighth, ninth, and tenth deciles, where the variation in policy occurs).  
We then estimated models with the full set of indicators and interactions corresponding to equations (3) 
and (4).  In all cases, we still found evidence that higher minimum wages enhanced the effects of the 
EITC, although sometimes this evidence only emerged over particular ranges of the EITC (e.g., the 
minimum wage enhanced the effect of a “medium” EITC relative to no EITC). 28 
VI. Conclusions 
The expansion of the federal EITC and the implementation of EITC supplements and higher 
minimum wages at the state level have noticeably altered the low-wage labor market over the past 15 
years.  In this paper, we study how this combination of policies has influenced work incentives and labor 
market outcomes for various groups of low-skilled individuals, and we examine the concomitant effects 
on the economic well-being of families.  We first develop a simple theoretical model that illustrates the 
ways in which minimum wages and the EITC could interact, and show that such interactions could 
differentially affect various groups.
40  In particular, we show that a higher minimum wage could enhance 
the effect of the EITC for women by inducing particular subgroups to increase their willingness to work 
to a greater extent than would be caused by the EITC alone.  But it is also possible for a high EITC 
coupled with a high minimum wage to have adverse effects, especially for low-skilled adults or teenagers 
who may have to compete with the women who are drawn into the labor market by a higher EITC.  We 
then estimate models that allow for interactions between minimum wages and the EITC to assess the 
relevance of these possibilities.   
Our results confirm earlier research indicating that the EITC is an effective means of encouraging 
work among less-skilled single mothers.  We also find that the EITC interacts with the minimum wage in 
a way that amplifies the labor supply response and increase in earnings among single women with 
children, suggesting that the combination of an EITC and minimum wage can provide an additional boost 
to the incomes of such families.  However, we also find that the EITC and minimum wage have adverse 
effects on the employment and earnings of less-skilled and minority individuals without children in the 
home, suggesting that the benefits afforded to single women come at a cost, with minimum wages 
exacerbating the potentially adverse effects of the EITC on low-skilled individuals not eligible for the 
EITC.   
                                                 
40 We have framed this discussion in terms of how variation in the minimum wage alters the effects of the EITC, 
mainly because this is how the policy argument is often couched.  Of course, an interaction between the two 
policies in a regression model can just as well be interpreted as how a higher EITC influences the effects of the 
minimum wage.   29 
Thus, whether or not the policy combination of a high EITC and a high minimum wage is viewed 
as favorable or unfavorable ultimately depends on whose earnings or incomes policymakers are targeting.  
The distributional goals of public policy typically focus more on family income than on individual 
income.  Moreover, it seems fair to say that policymakers have been most concerned with increasing 
resources for families with children, via the EITC, welfare, and other policies.  However, the recent 
policy debate has also refocused attention on those without children in the home, and in particular on the 
low-skilled men who, according to our estimates, are hit especially hard by a combination of a high EITC 
and a high minimum wage.  For example, in support of an expansion in the EITC for those without 
children, Berlin (2007) argues that policies that increase income from labor market participation for less-
skilled men might reduce the relative attractiveness of illicit sources of income, as well as make such men 
more attractive marriage partners and thus help to reverse the declines in marriage and increases in out-of-
wedlock childbearing and childrearing that have occurred in recent decades.
41  In addition, Gitterman et 
al. (2007) point out that many men who are non-custodial parents still have financial responsibility for 
their children.  These arguments suggest that policymakers should not focus solely on how policies affect 
earnings of families with children and low-skilled or female heads.   
Finally, the evidence of policy interactions between the EITC and the minimum wage indicates 
that research on the distributional effects of one policy in isolation may be too limited.  As one example, 
we noted in Section II that the existing research does not find beneficial distributional effects of the 
minimum wage.  However, this research did not consider policy interactions, and in our review of this 
work (Neumark and Wascher, forthcoming), we suggested that the distributional effects of minimum 
wages may vary with the institutional and policy setting.  Indeed, the evidence that there are interactive 
effects between the EITC and the minimum wage points to just one of a number of possible avenues by 
which changes in welfare and incentives to work over the past decade in the U.S. may have altered the 
                                                 
41 Our estimates do not speak directly to this alternative type of EITC.  At the same time, the evidence of adverse 
effects of the present EITC on low-skilled individuals without children also suggests that a substantially more 
generous EITC for those without children could pose negative tradeoffs with respect to the women whose 
employment and earnings are boosted by the EITC as it is currently structured.  
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effects of the minimum wage.  These avenues merit further study.  And, of course, the question can be 
turned around to extend the question this paper studies, asking how other policy changes may have 
influenced the effectiveness of the EITC.   
  
References 
Baker, Michael, Dwayne Benjamin, and Shuchita Stanger. 1999. “The Highs and Lows of the Minimum 
Wage Effect: A Time-Series Cross-Section Study of the Canadian Law.” Journal of Labor 
Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2, April, pp. 318-50. 
Berlin, Gordon L. 2007. “Rewarding the Work of Individuals: A Counterintuitive Approach to Reducing 
Poverty and Strengthening Families.” The Future of Children, Vol. 17, No. 2, Fall, pp. 17-42. 
Bernstein, Jared. 2004. “Helping Working Families: The Earned Income Tax Credit, Hoffman and Seidman 
(book review).” Social Service Review, Vol. 78, No. 1, March, pp. 153-57.  
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. “How Much Should We Trust 
Differences-in-Differences Estimators.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 1, February, 
pp. 249-75. 
Berube, Alan, Ann Kim, Benjamin Forman, and Megan Burns. 2002. “The Price of Paying Taxes: How Tax 
Preparation and Refund Loan Fees Erode the Benefits of the EITC.” Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution and Progressive Policy Institute. 
Bingley, Paul, and Ian Walker. 2008. “The Labor Supply Effect of In-Kind Transfers.” Unpublished paper, 
University of Warwick.   
Blank, Rebecca M., and Lucie Schmidt. 2001. “Work, Wages, and Welfare.” In Rebecca M. Blank and Ron 
Haskins, eds., The New World of Welfare (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution), pp. 70-102. 
Burkhauser, Richard V., Kenneth A. Couch, and Andrew J. Glenn. 1996. “Public Policies for the Working 
Poor: The Earned Income Tax Credit Versus the Minimum Wage.” Research in Labor Economics, 
Vol. 15, pp. 65-109. 
Cameron, Stephen, and James J. Heckman. 1993. “The Nonequivalence of High School Equivalents.” 
Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Pt. 1), January, pp. 1-47. 
Cancian, Maria, and Arik Levinson. 2005. “Labor Supply Effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit: Evidence 
from Wisconsin’s Supplemental Benefit for Families with Three Children.” NBER Working Paper 
No. 11454. 
Economic Policy Institute. 2004. “The Minimum Wage and Earned Income Tax Credit: Partners in Making 
Work Pay.” Available at www.epinet.org/content.cfm/webfeatures_snapshots_05052004 (viewed 
May 24, 2004). 
Eissa, Nada, and Jeffrey Liebman. 1996. “Labor Supply Response to the Earned Income Tax Credit.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 2, May, pp. 605-37. 
Eissa, Nada, and Hilary Williamson Hoynes. 2004. “Taxes and the Labor Market Participation of Married 
Couples: The Earned Income Tax Credit.” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 88, No. 9-10, August, 
pp. 1931-58. 
Fiscal Policy Institute. 2004. “State Minimum Wages and Employment in Small Businesses.”  Fiscal Policy 
Institute, New York, NY. 
Garthwaite, Craig. 2004. “Better Ways to Help Those Earning Little.” Atlanta-Journal Constitution (op-ed), 
September 6. 
Gitterman, Daniel P., Lucy S. Gorham, and Jessica L. Dorrance. 2007. “Expanding the EITC for Single 
Workers and Couples Without Children (aka Tax Relief for Low-Wage Workers).” Unpublished 
paper, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
Grant, James H., and Daniel S. Hamermesh. 1981. “Labor Market Competition among Youths, White 
Women, and Others.” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 63, No. 3, August, pp. 354-60. 
Greenhouse, Steven. 2006. “Group Starts Anti-Union Campaign.” New York Times, February 14.  
Hoffman, Saul D., and Laurence S. Seidman. 2003. Helping Working Families: The Earned Income Tax 
Credit. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
Hotz, V. Joseph, and John Karl Scholz. 2003. “The Earned Income Tax Credit.” In Robert A. Moffitt, ed. 
Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 
141-97. 
Kilborn, Peter T. 1997. “A Minimal-Impact Minimum Wage.” New York Times, April 6. 
Korenman, Sanders and David Neumark. 1991. “Does Marriage Really Make Men More Productive?” 
Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 26, No. 2, Spring, pp. 282-307.  
Leigh, Andrew. 2005. “Who Benefits from the Earned Income Tax Credit? Incidence Among Recipients, 
Coworkers, and Firms.” The Australian National University Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
Discussion Paper No. 494.  
Leigh, Andrew. 2007. “Who Benefits from the Earned Income Tax Credit? Incidence Among Recipients, 
Coworkers, and Firms.” Unpublished paper, Australian National University. 
Levitis, Jason A., and Nicholas Johnson. 2006. “Together, State Minimum Wages and State Earned Income 
Tax Credits Make Work Pay.” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Available at www.cbpp.org/7-
12-06sfp.htm (viewed November 28, 2007). 
Liebman, Jeffrey B. 1998. “The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Incentives and the Income 
Distribution.” In James Poterba, ed. Tax Policy and the Economy, Vol. 12 (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press), pp. 83-199. 
Machin, Stephen, and Alan Manning. 1994. “Minimum Wages, Wage Dispersion and Employment: 
Evidence from the UK Wages Councils.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 47, No. 2, 
January, pp. 319-29. 
Manning, Alan. 2003. Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Meyer, Bruce. 2002. “Labor Supply at the Extensive and Intensive Margins: The EITC, Welfare, and Hours 
Worked.” American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, May, pp. 373-79. 
Neumark, David, and William Wascher. 1996. “The Effects of Minimum Wages on Teenage Employment 
and Enrollment: Estimates from Matched CPS Data.” Research in Labor Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 25-
64. 
Neumark, David, and William Wascher. 2001. “Using the EITC to Help Poor Families: New Evidence and a 
Comparison with the Minimum Wage.” National Tax Journal, Vol. 54, No. 2, June, pp. 281-318. 
Neumark, David, and William Wascher. 2007a. “Minimum Wages and Employment.” Foundations and 
Trends in Microeconomics, Vol. 3, Nos. 1-2, pp. 1-186. 
Neumark, David, and William Wascher. 2007b. “Minimum Wages, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and 
Employment: Evidence from the Post-Welfare Reform Era.” NBER Working Paper No. 12915. 
Neumark, David, and William Wascher. Forthcoming. Minimum Wages (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
Romich, Jennifer L., and Thomas Weisner. 2000. “How Families View and Use the EITC: Advance Payment 
versus Lump Sum Delivery.” National Tax Journal, Vol. 53, No. 4, December (Part 1), pp. 1245-64. 
Rothstein, Jesse. 2008. “The Unintended Consequences of Encouraging Work: Tax Incidence and the EITC.” 
Unpublished paper, Princeton University. 
Scholz, John Karl. 1994. “The Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation, Compliance, Antipoverty 






















Figure 1: Minimum Wages and the EITC in a 
Competitive Labor Market 
W0 
W1 
Figure 3: Changes in Shares of Families Covered by 














1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Year





























1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Year
All states EITC supplement states
  





















1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Year






























0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Minimum wage
Note: State minimum wage is percent deviation from federal.
Slope (standard error) = .26 (.08)
  





45, high school 
degree at most 
Single women, 18-
45, black or 
Hispanic 
Married women, 
18-45, high school 
degree at most 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
1  child  .23  .26 .26 .26 
2+  children  .22  .26 .31 .54 
Black  .21  .23 .61 .09 
Hispanic .14  .16 .51 .26 
Age  28.4  27.4 29.0 28.1 
Highest education       
High  school  dropout  .16  .22 .24 .20 
High  school  degree  .57  .79 .58 .80 
Some college  .07  0  .07  0 
Bachelor’s or higher  .18  0  .11  0 
Economic outcomes       
Employed  .79  .74 .72 .66 
Annual hours, 
conditional 
1,633  1,510  1,585 
Log annual earnings  7.53  6.90  6.89  6.30 
Economic outcomes, 
no children 
     
Employed  .81  .76 .74 .79 
Annual hours, 
conditional 
1,727  1,586 1,652 1,762 
Log annual earnings  7.94  7.16  7.22  7.63 
Economic outcomes, 
with children 
     
Employed  .75  .72 .70 .63 
Annual hours, 
conditional 
1,513  1,439 1,594 1,528 
Log annual earnings  7.03  6.68  6.65  5.96 
N 163,320  121,967  54,681  52,703 
N  (hours) 129,786  92,056 40,060 35,428 
The children variables are based on the presence of children 18 or under in the household.  
“Single” means divorced, widowed, or separated.  “Married” means married, spouse present.  For 
log earnings, $1 is substituted for zero earnings prior to taking logs.  All estimates are weighted.    
Table 1B: Descriptive Statistics for Individuals, 1997-2006 








Highest education   
High school dropout  .12 
High school degree  .54 
Some college  .07 
Bachelor’s or higher  .27 
Economic outcomes   
Employment .84 
Annual hours, conditional  1,793 
Log wage  2.40 
Log annual earnings  8.26 
Economic outcomes, high school 
degree at most  
 
Employment .80 
Annual hours, conditional  1,687 
Log wage  2.22 
Log annual earnings  7.70 
Economic outcomes, high school 
degree at most and black or Hispanic  
 
Employment .75 
Annual hours, conditional  1,723 
Log wage  2.17 
Log annual earnings  7.21 
Economic outcomes, high school 
degree at most, single male, and 
black or Hispanic  
 
Employment .77 
Annual hours, conditional  1,753 
Log wage   2.19 
Log annual earnings  7.41 
Economic outcomes, some college or 
higher   
 
Employment .91 
Annual hours, conditional  1,975 
Log wage  2.70 
Log annual earnings  9.35 
N 177,393 
N (log wage, hours)  150,748 
See notes to Table 1A.    








45, high school 
degree at most 
Single women, 
18-45, black or 
Hispanic 
Family head or 
individual 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Female .46    1  1  1 
1 child  .17  .19  .21  .23 
2+ children  .31  .23  .28  .34 
Black .14  .22  .26    .65 
Hispanic .15  .13 .16  .37 
Age 32.8  31.2  30.6  31.4 
Married, spouse present  .43  0  0  0 
Married, spouse absent  .02  0  0  0 
Divorced, widowed, or 
separated 
.17 .35  .38  .31 
Highest education        
High school dropout  .13  .13  .20  .23 
High school degree  .51  .54  .80  .56 
Some college  .09  .09  0  .07 
Bachelor’s or higher  .28  .24  0  .13 
Economic outcomes        
Earnings < poverty  .20  .37  .47  .46 
Earnings < .5·poverty  .13  .25  .33  .32 
Economic outcomes, no 
children 
      
Earnings < poverty  .21  .30  .40  .35 
Earnings < .5·poverty  .15  .21  .29  .26 
Economic outcomes, 
with children 
      
Earnings < poverty  .20  .49  .55  .55 
Earnings < .5·poverty  .11  .32  .36  .37 
N 376,793  105,383  72,730  36,495 
See notes to Table 1A.  “Families” include primary or unrelated individuals.     












degree at most 
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N 163,320  121,967  54,681  52,703 
Hours, conditional        




















N 129,786  92,056  40,060  35,428 
Log earnings        




















N 163,320  121,967  54,681  52,703 
In the log earnings specification, $1 is substituted for zero earnings prior to taking logs.  The 
estimated coefficients of the EITC-kids interactions are robust to including state-specific linear 
trends, or state-year interactions; in the latter specification the main EITC effect drops out.  All 
estimates are weighted and standard errors are clustered on states.  
  









black or Hispanic 
Less-educated 
single black or 
Hispanic men 
Log wages  (1) (2)  (3) 
















N 150,748  85,050  70,768 
Employment      
















N 177,393  99,336  79,944 
Hours, conditional      
















N 150,748  85,050  70,768 
Log earnings      
















N 177,393  99,336  79,944 
Notes from Table 2 apply.  The log wage regressions condition on positive earnings and hours of 
work in the previous year.  “Low-skilled” is defined as high-school degree at most.  For the 
results shown, the sample includes all those with at least some college and the low-skilled 
treatment group as defined in the column heading.  The estimated of the EITC-low-skill 
interactions are robust to including state-specific linear trends, or state-year interactions.     
Table 3B: Estimated EITC Effects on Low-Skilled, Childless, Individuals, Aged 18-
35, Variation with Share Affected by EITC, 1998-2006 
  Using share filing 
for EITC 
Using share of single 
mothers 
Log wages  (1) (2) 












EITC × low-skill × 1997 





N 139,099  139,099 
Employment    












EITC × low-skill × 1997 





N 164,166  164,166 
Hours, conditional    












EITC × low-skill × 1997 






N 139,099  139,099 
Log earnings    












EITC × low-skill × 1997 






N 164,166  164,166 
See notes to Table 3A.  The sample corresponds to column (1) of that table.  Data from 
1997 are omitted; estimates corresponding to Table 3A excluding 1997 were very 
similar to estimates in Table 3A.  The share in the interaction is demeaned, so the EITC 
× low-skill coefficient measures the relative effect of the EITC on the low-skilled at the 
mean of the corresponding share.   





Single female  
family head or 
individual, 
 18-45 
Single female  
family head or 
individual, 18-45, high 
school degree at most 
Single female  
family head or 
individual, 18-45, 
black or Hispanic 
P(Earnings<Poverty)  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 






















      




















N 376,793  105,383  72,730  36,495 
See notes to Table 3A.  The sample is restricted to heads of families, primary individuals, or unrelated 
individuals.  The estimated coefficients of the EITC-kids interactions are robust to including state-
specific linear trends, or state-year interactions.   
 
  




Single, 18-45, high 
school degree at most 
Single, 18-45, 
black or Hispanic 
Employment  (1) (2)  (3) 
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N 163,320  121,967  54,681 
See notes to Tables 2 and 3A.  The minimum wage variable (MW) is the average of 
the log of the contemporaneous and lagged minimum wages.  In the minimum wage-
EITC interactions, the minimum wage variable is demeaned, so the EITC coefficients 
have the same interpretation (at the means) as in Table 2.  The estimated coefficients 
of the EITC-kids, MW-kids, and EITC-MW-kids interactions are robust to including 
state-specific linear trends, or state-year interactions.  Sample sizes are as in Table 2.    
Table 6: Estimated Effects of EITC-Minimum Wage Interactions on Low-Skilled, Childless Individuals, 
Aged 18-35, 1997-2006  
Low-skilled group:  Less-educated 
individuals 
Less-educated black or 
Hispanic 
Less-educated single 
black or Hispanic men 
Log wages  (1) (2)  (3) 
















































Employment      
















































Log earnings      
















































N 177,393  99,336  79,944 
See notes to Table 3A.  “Low-skilled” is defined as high-school degree at most.  In the minimum wage-
EITC interactions, the minimum wage variable is demeaned, so the EITC coefficients have the same 
interpretation (at the means) as in Table 3A; the EITC variable is also demeaned in the interactions, so the 
minimum wage coefficients estimate the minimum wage effects at the mean EITC.  The estimated 
coefficients of the EITC-low-skill, MW-low-skill, and EITC-MW-low-skill interactions are robust to 
including state-specific linear trends, or state-year interactions.      






Black or Hispanic 





























































































N 105,724  78,407  27,317 
The sample consists of individuals between the ages of 16 to 19 who are included in the monthly 
ORG files from the Current Population Survey between January 1997 and December 2007.  
Standard errors are clustered on state.  All specifications include controls for the share of the 
population in the group studies, the statewide unemployment rate, education (16 categories), 
black, Hispanic, marital status (7 CPS categories), state, calendar year and month, and state-
specific time trends.  The minimum wage variable is the average of the log of the current month’s 
state-specific minimum wage and the log of the minimum wage lagged one year.  In the 
interactive specifications, the interaction is between the minimum wage variable minus its mean 
and the state EITC supplement.  Earnings are the product of wages and weekly hours, and are set 
to zero if hours are zero; observations with nominal wages less than $1 are dropped.  N refers to 
the size of the samples used in the employment and earnings regressions.  The sample size for the 
wage regressions is smaller because individuals with zero hours are excluded.  All estimates are 
weighted. 
  







Black or Hispanic 





























































































N 104,807  77,616  27,191 
See notes to Table 7A. 
  










Single female family 
head or individual, 
18-45, high school 
degree at most  
Single female 
family head or 
individual, 18-45, 
black or Hispanic 
P(Earnings<Poverty)  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 






























































      




























































See notes to Tables 3A and 4.  In the minimum wage-EITC interactions, the minimum wage 
variable is demeaned, so the EITC coefficients have the same interpretation (at the means) as in 
Table 4.  The estimated coefficients of the EITC-kids, MW-kids, and EITC-MW-kids interactions 
are robust to including state-specific linear trends, or state-year interactions.  Sample sizes are as in 
Table 4.   
Table 9: Implied Effect on Employment of 10% State EITC Supplement on Single Women, at Different 





45, high school 
degree at most 
Single female, 18-
45, black or 
Hispanic 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
At sample mean of minimum wage      
























Minimum wage 10% higher      
























Difference relative to effect at 
mean minimum wage  
    
























Minimum wage 25% higher       
























Difference relative to effect at 
mean minimum wage  
    
























t-statistics are the same by construction for the calculation of differences relative to the mean 
minimum wage using the minimum wage 10% or 25% above the sample mean.  The estimated 
differences are robust to including state-year interactions; in these specifications only the differences 
are identified.  See notes to Table 5. 
Table 10: Implied Effect on Log Earnings of 10% State EITC Supplement on Childless Individuals Aged 18-35, at 
Different Minimum Wage Levels, Based on Table 6 Estimates 
Low-skilled group:  Less-educated 
individuals 
Less-educated black or 
Hispanic 
Less-educated single 
black or Hispanic men 


















































Difference relative to effect at 
mean minimum wage  


















































Difference relative to effect at 
mean minimum wage  

























t-statistics are the same by construction for the calculation of differences relative to the mean minimum wage using 
the minimum wage 10% or 25% above the sample mean.  High-skill refers to individuals with at least some 
college; low-skill is defined as a high-school degree at most.  The estimated differences are robust to including 
state-year interactions; in these specifications only the differences are identified.  See notes to Table 6. 
Table 11: Implied Effect on Family Earnings of 10% State EITC Supplement on Family Earnings Relative to 
Poverty, at Different Minimum Wage Levels, Based on Table 8 Estimates  







family head or 
individual, 18-45 
Single female 
family head or 
individual, 18-45 








At sample mean of minimum wage  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 






























Minimum wage 10% higher        






























Difference relative to effect at 
mean minimum wage  
      






























Minimum wage 25% higher         






























Difference relative to effect at 
mean minimum wage  
      






























t-statistics are the same by construction for the calculation of differences relative to the mean minimum wage 
using the minimum wage 10% or 25% above the sample mean.  The estimated differences are robust to 
including state-year interactions; in these specifications only the differences are identified.  See notes to Table 
8. 
 
 